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Callahan: Callahan: Tort Liability for Suppliers of Alcohol

TORT LIABILITY FOR SUPPLIERS
OF ALCOHOL
Alcohol consumption is a widely-accepted form of social conduct
which many people consider a necessary gesture of hospitality. At the same
time, it is certainly this nation's greatest drug abuse problem in terms of
wide-spread use and direct causal relationship with accidental injuries and
criminal conduct.' The role of alcohol consumption in traffic accidents is
well-known and extensively documented. 2 Some studies indicate that as
many as 73 % of traffic fatalities involved drivers who were at least partially
3
inebriated.
The role of alcohol in violent crimes is not so widely understood.
Research in some cities has shown that an extraordinary proportion of
murders and violent assaults involved perpetrators and victims who were
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crime.4 Statistics of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal that drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and other alcohol-related crimes comprise a significant percentage
of all arrests in this country. 5
Because of the danger to human life and property inherent in the
abuse of alcohol, an increasing number of jurisdictions impose tort liability on persons whose acts of supplying alcohol to another result in injury.
The development of this tort has been hampered by the importance of
alcohol as a social institution. Courts have been reluctant to treat the act of
supplying alcohol as dangerous ivhen so many people consider it a friendly
gesture. This comment will examine the development of this tort, the rationale for imposing liability, and the trend toward expanding liability.
An essential element of tort liability is a wrongful or negligent act
which results in injury to another person. 6 The sale or distribution of
1.

E.

2.

See generally PRESIDENT'S

BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS

260-64 (1972).

COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS

(1967)

[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS].
3. J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 414 (5th ed.
1976); J. FINCH & J. SMITH, PSYCHIATRIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF AUTO

49 (1970) (concerning automobile fatalities in Houston, Texas, from
October 15, 1967, to April 15, 1968).
4. Researchers in Ohio during 1954 found that 43% of killers studied had
been drinking at the time of the offense. Another study of 588 homicides in
Philadelphia in 1958 showed that 64% were committed while the victim,
perpetrator, or both were under the influence of alcohol. Both of these studies
and others are cited in TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS, supra note 2, at
40-41.
5. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 175
(1977).
6. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 7 (4th ed. 1971).
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alcoholic beverages to a minor or intoxicated person can be a wrongful act
7
under the laws of almost every state, as such sale or distribution is illegal.
In addition, several states have statutes specifically authorizing tort actions
when the wrongful delivery of alcohol results in injury. 8 These "dramshop
acts" often expand the situations in which distribution of alcohol may be
tortious.
Injuries resulting from alcohol use fall into two general categories. Occasionally, the plaintiff will suffer injury because of his own intoxication.
More often, an inebriated minor or drunken adult who was illegally served
alcohol injures another person, the plaintiff, who sues the supplier of the
alcohol.
Even when these two elements of tort liability- the wrongful act and
subsequent injury-are present, the third essential element, proximate
causation, has been a major stumbling block to the development of tort
liability for suppliers of alcohol. 9 The question is not whether intoxication
is a cause of the injury; rather, it is whether the act of supplying the
beverage or the act of consuming it is the proximate, or nearest, cause.
Until twenty years ago, most courts held that the consumption of the
alcohol was the proximate cause of the ensuing injuries, and that the supplier of the liquor was not liable.10 There have been, however, several exceptions to this general rule. Dramshop acts are one such exception. The

7. The Missouri statute is typical. Under RSMO § 311.310 (1978):
[A]ny person whomsoever, except his or her parent or guardian, who
shall procure for, sell, give away or otherwise supply intoxicating liquor
to any person under the age of twenty-one years, or to any intoxicated
person or any person appearing to be in a state of intoxication
...

shall be deemed guilty of a midemeanor.

See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-901 (Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131
(1976); KY. REV. STAT. § 244.080 (1972); OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 537 (1971).

8. Fifteen states currently have civil damage acts: ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§
121-122 (1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (1960); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, §§
135-136 (1969); IOWA CODE § 123.92 (1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.22
(1976); MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.070 (1969); N.Y.
GEN. OB. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975);
OHIO REV. CODEANN. §§ 4399.01, .05, .07, .08 (Page 1973); OR. REV. STAT. §
30.730 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-11-1,-2 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501
(1972); WIS. STAT. § 176.35 (1975); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977). Nevada and

Oregon restrict recovery to members of the families of persons to whom alcohol is
supplied illegally. Most statutes allow recovery by any injured person. At least five
states (Delaware, Maine, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Washington) have
repealed dramshop acts since 1962. Compare the above list with that inJohnson,
Drunken Driving- The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor of Intoxicating
Liquor, 37 IND. L.J. 317, 321 n.27 (1962).
9. 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 430, at 717 (1947).
10. See, e.g., King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505 (1886); Collier v. Stamatis, 63
Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210
P.2d 530 (1949); Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967); Howlett
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/7
v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949).
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other major exception involves various factors which transform the
delivery of alcohol into an intentional tort.
One such factor is the supplier's knowledge that providing alcohol to a
certain person will probably cause injury. Sometimes, an alcoholic's spouse
or a close family member will request that the proprietor of the alcoholic's
favorite drinking establishment stop selling to him. Such a request rarely
succeeds.
Swanson v. Ball" typifies a not uncommon situation. Mr. Swanson's
addiction to alcohol interfered with his health and home life. His wife sent
several letters to the local tavern, telling the proprietor to refrain from
serving liquor to her husband. The bartender continued to sell drinks to
Mr. Swanson, who became ill and died. Mrs. Swanson sued the tavernowner for loss of her husband's aid, society, and comfort. The petition,
which stated that the barkeep's actions were willful, malicious, and illegal,
was held to state a cause of action at common law.
Pratt v. Daly 2 was a similar case. The plaintiff's husband was an
alcoholic. Pratt sued the bartender, alleging that he sold liquor to her husband knowing of his addiction. The Arizona Supreme Court held that
Pratt's petition stated a claim for an intentional tort.
The appellate courts in Swanson and Pratt took an interesting approach in deciding these cases. Both courts recognized the dangerous addictive properties of alcohol, and relied on an older line of cases holding
that druggists who sold customers laudanum (a distillation of opium and
alcohol) knowing of the customers' addictions were liable in tort to the
families of the addicts."S
Just as alcohol addicts have particular problems, so do persons who are
unfamiliar with the effects of liquor. In Ibach v. Jackson, 14 the plaintiffs
decedent, a woman who rarely drank, was lured to a hotel room by the
defendant and plied with liquor. The defendant was not a commercial
supplier of alcohol, and was obviously not interested in selling anything on
this occasion. The next morning, the decedent was found beaten to death
by persons unknown. Her next of kin sued the defendant for wrongful
death. Unable to prove that he killed the decedent, the plaintiffs alleged
that he had forced her to drink and failed to properly care for her while she
was in his control. The Oregon Supreme Court held that this petition
stated a cause of action.
The Ibach case is representative of situations in which the defendant
plays an active role (beyond the act of providing liquor) in causing the
plaintiffs injury. The types of actions which can constitute an intentional
tort in this area are limited only by one's imagination.
11. 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940).
12. 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
13. See Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422, 122 N.E. 247 (1919); Moberg v.
Published
University
of Missouri
School 998
of Law
Scholarship Repository, 1979
Scott,by 38
S.D. 422,
161 N.W.
(1917).
14. 148 Or. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1934).

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 7

760

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44

One such example is the Kentucky case of Nally v. Blandford. " Nally
entered the defendant's liquor store and announced to all present that he
would down an entire quart of whiskey in one long swallow. The defendant
sold him a quart and several bets were made. Nally then emptied the bottle, fell into a coma, and died. His wife's petition was held to state a cause
of action for an intentional tort on the basis of an allegation that the defendant knew of the decedent's dangerous intention at the time of the sale.
In other cases, the intentional aspects of the defendant's actions were
even more blatant. In Galvin v. Jennings,1 6 the plaintiff became so intoxicated in the defendant's bar that the bartender had to help him out of the
building at closing time. Although the plaintiff was too drunk to move
under his own power, the defendant's employees placed him inside his car
and gave him instructions on how to turn the steering wheel to get out of
the parking lot. A collision ensued shortly thereafter. The Third Circuit
reversed a judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiffs contributory negligence was no bar in a case alleging an intentional injury.
The other major exception to the traditional rule that a supplier of
alcohol is not responsible for resulting injury exists when there is a dramshop act in force. 1 7 Generally, dramshop acts create a statutory cause of
action for injuries caused by intoxicated persons against the persons who
supplied them with alcohol. The wording of many of these statutes indicates that their primary purpose is to protect the families of intoxicated persons from the disruption often caused by habitual
drunkenness. 18
Because this tort is statutorily defined, the appellate decisions usually
concern matters of interpretation. Two questions dominate the recent case
law in this area. The first is whether the intoxicated party himself has a
cause of action for his own injuries. The second issue is undoubtedly the
most important question in the development of tort liability for suppliers
of liquor: Is the social supplier liable as well as the seller?
The question of whether the intoxicated person may sue for his own injuries raises the issue of contributory negligence. In most cases, the consumption of alcohol is a voluntary act, and the consumer is at least as much
at fault as the supplier. In that sense, he contributes to his own injury in a
15. 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956).
16. 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961). Similarly, in Brockett v. Kitchen-Boyd
Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972), a youthful and intoxicated guest at an office party was loaded into his car by fellow employees. His
petition for injuries resulting from a subsequent crash was held to state a claim.
17. Missouri's Dramshop Act, codified in RSMo § 4487 (1929), was repealed
in 1939.
18. Michigan's statute is typical: "Every wife, husband, child, parent, guardian, or other persons who shall be injured in person or property, means of support or otherwise, by an intoxicated person ... shall have a right of action."
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.993 (1969). See also RSMO § 4487 (1929) (repealed 1939),
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/7
which began with the same words.

4

Callahan: Callahan: Tort Liability for Suppliers of Alcohol

1979]

SUPPLIERS OF ALCOHOL

way that a third party injured by a drunk does not. For that reason, many
courts refuse to grant relief to the intoxicated party. ' 9 However, the next of
kin may recover for the death or loss of services of the intoxicated person in
20
spite of his negligence.
The issue of contributory negligence has been overshadowed by the
more controversial question of what parties are liable under the dramshop
acts. It is clear that liability extends to commercial suppliers. In fact,
dramshop acts approach a strict liability theory in their application to liquor vendors.
The strict liability aspects of the dramshop acts for sellers of alcohol
are demonstrated in Kirilukv. Cohn. 2'In that case the plaintiffs husband
was served liquor at the defendant's bar until he became extremely intoxicated. When he returned home, he began to chase his wife around the
house, threatening to kill her. She grabbed a pistol and shot him to death.
She then sued the tavern owner for the wrongful death of her husband
under the Illinois Dramshop Act and recovered $10,000. The Illinois Court
of Appeals affirmed the verdict, holding that the jury could have found
the serving of the liquor to be the proximate cause of his death.
The more controversial question under the dramshop acts is whether
liability extends to the social purveyor of alcohol. Although most dramshop statutes specify that "giving" as well as selling alcohol may be a tortious act, 22 most courts are less willing to extend liability to the social supplier of alcohol. The courts treat this question as one of statutory interpretation, but it should be noted that most dramshop statutes are nearly
uniform in wording.
While in force, the former Iowa statute was identical in part with the
current language in the Illinois statute: "Every person who is injured" shall
have a cause of action "against any person" who contributed to that injury
by selling or giving liquor contrary to the laws of the state. 23 But while the

19. James v. Wicker, 309 Ill. App. 397, 33 N.E.2d 169 (1941); Hollerud v.
Malamis, 20 Mich. App. 748, 174 N.W.2d 626 (1969); Mitchell v. Shoals, Inc.,
19 N.Y.2d 338, 280 N.Y.S.2d 113, 227 N.E.2d 21 (1967).
20. Allowing the negligent acts of the intoxicated person to bar recovery by
his relatives would defeat the purpose of the dramshop acts, which is to reimburse
persons injured by the drunk. See Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 617
(Iowa 1972). The Minnesota Dramshop Act specifies that the state comparative
ault laws do not apply to actions brought by spouses and children under the
dramshop statute. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1967).
21. 16 Ill. App. 2d 385, 148 N.E.2d 607 (1958).
22. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1969); IOWA CODE § 123.92
(1977); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.993 (1969).
23. Compare former IOWA CODE § 129.2 (1966) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

43, § 135 (1969). Both state that "[e]very person who is injured in person or
property.., by any intoxicated person, has a right of action... against any perPublished
University
of Missouri
School
Law Scholarship
Repository,
1979
son by
who
by selling
or giving
toofanother
contrary
to the provisions
of this title any
intoxicating liquors."
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Iowa court in Williams v. Klemesrud24 was willing to extend liability to a
non-vendor who bought a bottle of vodka for a twenty-year-old friend as a
favor (after which the minor collided his car with the plaintiffs vehicle),
the Illinois courts have refused to hold social suppliers liable. 25
The reasons for the distinction are twofold. While Iowa courts interpreted their act as primarily remedial, 26 the Illinois courts hold that their
act is punitive, and must be strictly construed. This reason is largely illusory, however, since the Iowa act in effect at the time of the Williams
decision specifically provided for exemplary damages. 27 The major reason
for the reluctance of Illinois and other jurisdictions to expand liability is
that it "would open the floodgates of litigation.1 28 The liability of social
suppliers of alcohol will continue to be an important area of development,
both under the dramshop acts and in common law negligence actions.
In fact, dramshop acts and actions based on intentional injuries are of
limited importance in this area of tort law, while the significant
developments are occurring in common law negligence actions. Until
recently, courts have almost universally held that "it is not a tort to sell
liquor to an able-bodied man. ' 29 This general rule protected persons who
30
sold liquor to able-bodied women and able-bodied minors as well.
The usual justification for this rule was that supplying alcohol was not
the cause of the ensuing injury.3 ' In every negligence action, the plaintiff
must show the existence of a duty, and a breach of that duty which was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.3 2 The breach of duty occurs when
the supplier gives or sells liquor to another in violation of a statute or
regulation. Even when such a breach existed, however, most courts held

24. 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972). See also Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200
N.W.2d 149 (1972), a similar case imposing liability on a pers6n who gave liquor
to his minor brother.
25. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300
(1964). In LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (1967), the
Michigan court also declined to hold social suppliers liable.
26. Wendelin v. Russell, 259 Iowa 1152, 147 N.W.2d 188 (1966). In 1971,
the Iowa legislature amended the dramshop statute to limit liability to licensees
and permitees only. IOWA CODE § 123.92 (1973). It is interesting to note that
Iowa has only state-run liquor stores. See IOWA CODE §§ 123.22-.23 (1977).
27. Dramshop liability at the time of the Wendelin decision was governed by
IOWA CODE § 129.2 (1966). The "exemplary damages" provision was deleted in
1971. See IOWA CODE § 123.92 (1973).
28. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 423, 199 N.E.2d
300, 306 (1964).
29. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (1889).
30. See Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945) (no recovery
for the mother of a 15-year-old girl who was arrested after the defendant gave the
child liquor); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949)
(plaintiff was hit by an automobile driven by an intoxicated minor).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/7
31. 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquor § 430, at 717 (1947).
32. Nichols v. Blake, 418 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. 1967).
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that the consumption, rather than the supplying of liquor, was the prox33
imate cause of the injury.
These holdings stated a conclusion rather than a reason, and merely
reflected the reluctance of many courts to extend tort liability. One possible logical basis for the general rule is that the supplier of liquor could not
be expected to foresee the likelihood of injury. This argument may be
tenable in the sense that a statistically small percentage of any tavern's or
liquor store's customers will suffer injury as a result of intoxication in any
given time period.
But foreseeability and proximate causation are not really questions of
quantity or frequency of injury. The two concepts are closely intertwined
and concern logical possibilities of injury rather than statistical
3 4
probabilities.

The questions of causation and foreseeability were considered by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in its landmark decision in Rappaport v.
Nichols.3 5 The defendant Hub Bar served liquor to a minor, who crashed
his automobile into that of Arthur Rappaport, killing him. The New
Jersey Dramshop Act has been recently repealed, but the supreme court
held that the petition stated a cause of action against Hub Bar at common
law:
When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or
intoxicated person, the unreasonable risk of harm not only to the
minor or intoxicated person, but also to the traveling public may
readily be recognized and foreseen; this is particularly evident in
current times when traveling by car to and from the tavern is so
commonplace
and accidents resulting from drinking are so fre36
quent.

The California Supreme Court accepted this reasoning in Vesely v. Sager:
"If such furnishing [of alcohol] is a proximate cause, it is so because the
consumption, resulting intoxication, and injury-producing conduct are
foreseeable intervening causes, or at least the injury-producing conduct is
one of the hazards which makes such furnishing negligent. '37
With the collapse of the protective walls of causation and forseeability,
the "floodgates of litigation" were open, at least where commercial suppliers of alcohol were concerned. Since the decision in Rappaport, a number
of states and federal circuits have recognized common law negligence actions against persons who furnish alcohol in violation of the law.38
33.

See cases cited note 10 supra.

34. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876); Steele v.
Woods, 327 S.W.2d 187, 195 (Mo. 1959); W. PROSSER, THELAW OFTORTS§ 43
(4th ed. 1971).
35. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
36. Id. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
37. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 164, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971).
Published38.
by University
of Missouri
of Law Scholarship
Repository,
See Waynick
v. School
Chicago's
Last Dept.
Store, 1979
269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp.
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Liquor laws are important in common law negligence actions because
they provide a basis for finding a breach of duty: suppliers of alcohol have
a duty to the public not to furnish alcohol to minors or intoxicated
adults.39 Because the statutes and regulations play such a crucial role in
this tort, allegations of negligence per se are commonly joined with allega40
tions of common law negligence.
Negligence per se is an attractive concept to plaintiffs because once
they demonstrate a violation of a statute, they are relieved of the burden of
showing that the defendant's action was negligent. 4 1 However, the plaintiff in a negligence per se action must show in addition that the statute was
designed to protect the class of persons of which he was a member against
42
the type of injury actually suffered.
Only the first requirement, that the plaintiff be a member of the class
protected by the statute, has been a subject of much appellate litigation.
The question arises in the following context: Did the legislature intend to
protect only minors and intoxicated persons by prohibiting the delivery of
liquor to them, or was the statute designed to protect the public in general?
Some courts have held that such legislative prohibitions were intended
to protect only minors and intoxicated adults. In such a jurisdiction, a
plaintiff who is injured by a minor or intoxicated adult who was served
alcohol illegally cannot recover.
Missouri may follow this approach. In Moore v. Riley, 43 the plaintiff
was struck in the face with a glass thrown by an underage patron of a
Kansas City bar. The supreme court held that city ordinances prohibiting
minors from being on the premises of taverns were for the protection of the
minors' morality and that the plaintiff could not recover on the basis of
negligence per se.
348 (D. Mont. 1969); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1971); Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. App. 1967); Elder v.
Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626
(Ky. 1968); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968);
Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); Berkely v. Park, 47 Misc.
2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971); Jardine v. Upper
Darby Lodge, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54
Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1965).
39. See, e.g., RSMO § 311.310 (1978).
40. See, eg., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145
Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292
(1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn, 84 N.J. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208 (1964).
41. W. PROSSER, THELAWOFTORTS§ 36, at 200 (4thed. 1971). In some
states, however, proof of violation of the statute is merely "some evidence" of
negligence. See Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18
(1968).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/7
42. Endicott v. St. Regis Inv. Co., 443 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1969).
43. 487 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1972).
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The same approach was followed by the Supreme Court of Oregon in
Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity.4 Jane
Weiner was a guest at a fraternity party where liquor was served indiscriminately. She accepted a ride home with an intoxicated minor, who made
an unsuccessful attempt to drive his car through a brick wall. She sued the
fraternity, the owners of the ranch where the party was held, and the
fraternity member who actually bought the liquor. The action against the
individual fraternity member was based on negligence per se in supplying
liquor to a minor. The court held that Weiner had no cause of action
against him because the statute was for the protection of minors, not for
the public in general.
Most jurisdictions which have considered this question hold that these
statutes are for the protection of the general public, including minors and
intoxicated adults. Thus, in these states, persons injured by intoxicated
persons, as well as the minors and drunken adults themselves, can maintain actions against liquor suppliers. 4 5 At any rate, it is difficult to gauge
the importance of problems which are unique to negligence per se actions
for several reasons. First, most petitions in this area of tort law request
relief for both common law and per se negligence. 46 Also, the wording of
the petitions often makes it difficult to tell whether the claim is based on
common law negligence, negligence per se, or both, because common law
negligence petitions often incorporate statutes to establish the existence
and breach of a legal duty.4 7 Finally, it is not always clear whether the ap4
pellate decisions are upholding actions on the basis of one theory or both. 8
Whichever theory is used, identical issues arise concerning the identity
of the plaintiff and the type of injury suffered. In most cases, the plaintiff
is injured by a minor or drunken adult who was illegally given liquor. Occasionally, the minor or drunken adult may recover for injuries he suffers
himself. The causes of injuries suffered fall into two general categories:
automobile accidents and violent conduct.
Most of the early negligence cases allowing recovery for wrongful sales
of alcohol involved plaintiffs who were injured by minors or intoxicated
adults in automobile crashes. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department
Store49 involved a sale of liquor to an intoxicated person in Illinois and an
44.

258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).

45. See, e.g., Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Prevatt v. McClennan,
201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp., 259 Or.
583, 488 P.2d 436 (1971).
46. See, e.g., Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Soronen
v. Olde Milford Inn, 84 N.J. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208 (1964).
47. Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963);Jardine
v. Upper Darby Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
48.University
See Pike
v. George,
626,Repository,
629 (Ky.1979
1968); Jardine v. Upper
Published by
of Missouri
School 434
of LawS.W.2d
Scholarship
Darby Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 632, 198 A.2d 550, 553 (1964).
49. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
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automobile crash in Michigan. The Seventh Circuit rejected the application of the dramshop statute of either state, but held that the petition
stated a claim at common law. Another pioneer decision, Rappaport v.
Nichols,5 0 was a wrongful death case based on a sale to a minor and an ensuing two-car collision in which the plaintiffs decedent was killed.
Other cases arise from barroom brawls. Corcoranv. McNeal 5' involved a plaintiff who was attacked and thrown down a flight of stairs by a
drunk in the defendant's tavern. The action was based on the failure of the
taproom employees to protect the plaintiff, whose cries for help were ignored. In Giardinav. Solomon, 52 the court held that the defendant fraternity could be liable for furnishing liquor to a minor who assaulted the
plaintiff at a party. In Prevatt v. McClennan,53 the defendant tavern
owner was held liable for serving liquor to two minors who, while engaging
in a gunfight, shot the plaintiff. The causes of injuries which might suffice as a basis for liability are almost unlimited. Any injury traceable to a
state of inebriation -falling or losing money 54 - could constitute a basis of
recovery.
While most of the recent cases in this area of tort law have expanded
liability, a number of defenses are available to liquor suppliers. Where a
person who is served liquor in violation of a statute consequently suffers an
injury, contributory negligence may be a defense. If the plaintiff or plaintiffs decedent is a minor who was wrongfully supplied with alcohol, some
courts do not even address the issue of contributory negligence. A strong
statutory policy of protecting minors from alcohol and its effects 5 bars the
50.
supra.
51.

31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). See alsb text accompanying notes 35-36
400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960).

52. 360 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
53. 201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). See also Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam
Corp., 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436 (1971). In Stachniewicz, the court held that
OR. REV. STAT. § 471.410(3), which prohibited supplying alcohol to "visibly intoxicated" persons, was too vague to be used as a basis for negligence per se.
Nevertheless, a state liquor control regulation against permitting "loud, noisy,
disorderly or boisterous conduct on licensed premises" would allow the plaintiff to

recover for negligence per se. The author has found no cases in which a statute

prohibiting sales to "intoxicated persons" has been held too vague, despite the

fact that such a statute imposes a heavier burden on the liquor supplier than one
which prohibits sales to "visibly intoxicated persons." Some people can, of course,
be intoxicated without showing it. Oregon aid California are among the few
states using the words "visibly" or "obviously" in their statutes prohibiting sales to
intoxicated persons. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1974). The
vagueness argument was raised and rejected in Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.
3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
54. In an action under New York's dramshop statute, a plaintiff was allowed
to recover an amount of money which was taken from her intoxicated husband in
a robbery at the defendant's bar. Wilcox v. Conti, 174 Misc. 230, 20 N.Y.S.2d
106 (1940).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/7
55. See Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Smith v. Clark,
411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963).
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defendant from relying on this defense, but where the plaintiff is an adult,
the defense of contributory negligence succeeds more often. In Ramsey v.
Anctil, 56 the plaintiff was already intoxicated when the defendant sold
him several drinks. Ramsey became boisterous and began to pound his fist
on the table. His hand hit a glass, which shattered and severed a nerve in
his wrist. The New Hampshire legislature had repealed that state's dramshop act, but the state supreme court held that-the petition stated a cause
of action at common law. The court also noted that Ramsey's contributory
negligence in consuming the alcohol might bar recovery.
Several jurisdictions, however, reject the defense in negligence per se
actions. In Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 57 the plaintiffs husband was
already drunk when he entered the defendant's bar. After a few more
drinks, he fell off his barstool and became literally "dead drunk" when his
head hit a support beam as he fell to the floor. The New Jersey Superior
Court held that the defense of contributory negligence was unavailable,
relying on Restatement of Torts section 483. Under this rule, no contributory negligence is possible where the defendant violates a statute
designed for the protection of a particular class of persons. The NewJersey
statute outlawing sales to intoxicated persons was held to be for their protection. A Pennsylvania court reached the same result in Schelin v.
Goldberg,5" where the plaintiff, after being served alcohol until .he was
highly intoxicated, picked a fight with another customer in the bar and
lost an eye in the ensuing brawl.
Where the defense of contributory negligence is not available, defendants have asserted similar defenses with varying degrees of success. When
the action is based on an illegal sale to an intoxicated plaintiff, the defendant might attempt to show that the plaintiffs prior state of intoxication,
rather than the defendant's act in giving him more liquor, was the cause of
the injury.
In Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 59 the plaintiff, who was already inebriated, attended a party at the defendant's hotel. He became extremely
drunk and began to annoy other guests at the party. At that point,
someone locked him in the restroom. He attempted to escape through the
window and climbed on a fence outside. After crawling a few yards across
the fence, he fell forty-five feet to the roof of the hotel kitchen. His suit for
personal injuries was based on the hotel's act in serving him liquor after he
was visibly intoxicated. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment for the plaintiff, but noted that the defendant might have
avoided liability by showing that the plaintiff was so intoxicated that the
injury would have occurred without the incremental effect of later drinks
furnished by the defendant. This defense appears to place a nearly
56." 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
57.University
84 N.J.
Super. School
372, of202
208 (1964).
Published by
of Missouri
LawA.2d
Scholarship
Repository, 1979

58.
59.

188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
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impossible burden on the defendant, and is unlikely to be of any practical
value.
Another defense which might aid suppliers of alcohol in some situations is assumption of risk. In Deedsv. United States,60 Sandra Deeds was a
guest at a party given by the non-commissioned officers club at an Air
Force base. She accepted a ride home with an intoxicated minor who ran
his car off the road, injuring them both. Sandra brought suit under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 61 The Government defended the action on the
ground that Deeds had knowingly assumed the risk by accepting a ride
with a drunk.62 The district court acknowledged the viability of the
defense, but rejected it here because there was insufficient evidence that
she knew the extent of the serviceman's intoxication. However, fact situations similar to this are fairly common in this area of tort law, 63 and the
defense of assumption of risk could be of real benefit to defendants in
many cases.
Thus, in some situations, suppliers of alcohol may offer contributory
negligence or assumption of risk as defenses to a tort action. They might
also argue that it was not their liquor that caused the plaintiffs injury. As
courts extend liability to more defendants in more situations, it is
reasonable to assume that courts will look for ways to limit liability, and
these defenses will be more successful than in the past.
At the present time, however, the development in this area of tort law
is decidedly pro-plaintiff, as more jurisdictions accept the concept of
liability for persons who wrongfully furnish liquor to others. The most controversial issue in those jurisdictions which have recognized this tort is
whether liability should extend to the social supplier of liquor as well as the
commercial seller.
Most jurisdictions which have considered this question have answered
it in the negative. 64 The reasons offered are varied, but the true rationale
appears to be that holding the host of a party responsible for alcohol60. 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
62. The Government also contended that the emotional imbalance of the
serviceman (who had been jilted by his girlfriend at the party) was a superseding
cause relieving it of liability. The court rejected the argument under RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS§ 444 (1965): "An act done.., in normal response to
...
emotional disturbance to which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial
factor... is not a superseding cause .... "
63. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145
Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Elder v. Fisher, 217 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1966); Pike v.
George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Mitchell v. Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y.S.2d 338,
227 N.E.2d 21 (1967); Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
64. The question has most often arisen under dramshop statutes. See
Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1412 (1966). Manningv. Andy, 51 Pa. D. & C. 2d 324 (1970)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/7
and Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969)
are cases holding no liability under the common law.
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related injuries of his guests would lead to too many lawsuits. 65 Some courts
have stated that, since the social supplier of alcohol does not benefit
economically from his act, he should not suffer economically for it.66
Others recognize that drinking is a social institution, and are reluctant to
transform an act which most people consider a necessary part of hospitality
67
into a tort.
However, a few jurisdictions recognize common law liability of noncommercial suppliers of alcohol. A college fraternity was held liable for
serving alcohol to a minor who assaulted the plaintiff in Giardina v.
Solomon. 68 The court held that the policy of the statute making it illegal
for "any person" to "furnish" alcohol to a minor 69 outweighed the danger
of a possible increase in litigation due to extending liability to social
purveyors. It should be noted that most statutes regulating the distribution
of alcohol to minors and intoxicated persons are not restricted to commer70
cial vendors.
The same result was reached in Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity7l and in a recent California case, Coulterv.
SuperiorCourt of San Mateo County.72 In Coulter, the owners of an apartment complex held a party where alcohol was dispensed to potential
residents. One of the persons served was Janice Williams, who was
noticeably drunk. She attempted to drive the plaintiff home, but crashed
into an embankment on the way. The plaintiff sued the owners of the
apartment complex, alleging that they served Williams liquor in violation
of the statute, 73 knowing that she would be driving home afterwards. The
court held that the petition stated a valid claim. The risk to the public is
equal, the court said, and just as foreseeable, whether or not the person
dispensing the alcohol gets paid for it: "[I]t is small comfort to the widow
whose husband has been killed in an accident involving an intoxicated
driver to learn that the driver received the drinks from a hospitable social
65. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.W.2d 300
(1964); Manning v. Andy, 51 Pa. D. & C. 2d 324 (1970).
66. See Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897
(1969).
67. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300
(1964).
68. 360 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973). The federal court assumed that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which has yet to consider the question, would hold
social suppliers liable. The state supreme court will have the final say on this
issue.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (Purdon 1969).
70. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1974) ("every
person"); RSMO § 311.310 (1978) ("any person whomsoever").
71. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
72. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
73.

See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 25602 (West 1974). "Every person who

sells...
[or] gives..,
anySchool
alcoholic
to any obviously
Published
by University
of Missouri
of Law beverage..,
Scholarship Repository,
1979
intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor."
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host rather than by purchase at a bar." 74 The court also addressed the role
injury to
of alcohol as a social institution and concluded that the risks of 75
persons and property outweighed the importance of hospitality.
It seems likely that more jurisdictions will be willing to extend liability
to social purveyors in the future. This area of tort law is in a state of flux,
and in many states the various questions raised by tort liability for
purveyors of liquor have not yet been decided.
Missouri is such a jurisdiction. One of the earliest cases imposing
76
liability on a vendor of alcohol is a Missouri decision, Skinner v. Hughes.
The defendant sold liquor to the plaintiffs slave, who became intoxicated
and froze to death on the way home. The Missouri Supreme Court held the
defendant liable. The precedential value of this case is extremely questionable, both because of its antiquity and because the action was apparently brought on the theory of trespass on a chattel.
77
The only other Missouri case even remotely in point is Moore v. Riley,
which was discussed previously in connection with negligence per se actions. This was not really a case of tort liability for supplying alcohol. The
alleged wrongful act which was the basis of the action was allowing a minor
to be on the premises of a tavern. There was no allegation that the minor
was served liquor or was intoxicated, 78 and the law construed was a Kansas
City ordinance, 79 not the state statute controlling the distribution of
liquor.
In other words, tort liability for purveyors of alcohol is largely an open
question in Missouri. However, some guidance can be gleaned from the
decided cases. The Missouri decisions interpret liquor-control statutes
restricting the availability of alcohol to minors to be for the protection of
minors.8 0 Under this view, an intoxicated minor who suffers injury (or his
next of kin) should be able to maintain an action under present Missouri
law against the supplier for his injuries. Whether liability would extend to
other situations remains to be seen.
Considering the well-documented role of liquor in accidental and
violent injuries, it is clear that supplying alcohol can be a dangerous act in
some situations. Commercial suppliers, who know or have a duty to know
the laws governing sales of alcohol, and who benefit economically from
violations of the laws, should be economically responsible for resulting injuries.
74.
75.

21 Cal. 3d at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
"[W]e must surely balance any resulting moderation of hospitality with

the serious hazard to the lives, limbs, and property of the public at large... ."Id.

577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
13 Mo. 440 (1850).
487 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1972).
Id. at 558.
79. KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE§§ 4.26, .94 (1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/7
80. May Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 530 S.W.2d 460
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
at 154,
76.
77.
78.
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Whether social suppliers should be liable is a closer question. The
reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Coulter is logically persuasive that such liability should exist. The risk and foreseeability of injury
are equal regardless of whether the supplier is paid. At least in situations
where a host actively encourages drinking by a minor or by an adult who is
already obviously intoxicated, the social purveyor should be liable,
especially where the host knows that his guest will be driving soon after
drinking.
For those who are concerned about the possible injustice of extending
liability to social hosts, the jury system may be a factor in limiting recovery.
Many jurors would probably be reluctant to hold social hosts liable for acts
which the jurors themselves engage in on a regular basis. The threat of tort
liability may indeed discourage "hospitality" in the form of indiscriminate
flow of alcohol at social gatherings. But in a nation where tens of
thousands of people die each year as a direct result of alcohol consumption, this may well be an improvement.
STEVEN P. CALLAHAN
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